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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ANNEXATION OF TEXAS
Earl M. Maltz*

I. INTRODUCTION

The annexation of Texas was by any standard a pivotal
moment in the political history of the United States. The decision to add Texas to the Union was either directly or indirectly
responsible for the acquisition of all of the territory of the
United States south and west of the Louisiana Purchase. Annexation was also a critical issue in the presidential election of
1844 and the more general political struggle between Whigs and
Democrats. Moreover, the dispute over Texas was a flashpoint
in the evolving sectional conflict between the representatives of
the free states and slave states.'
The discussions of the issue in Congress had a dual aspect.
Many of the arguments both for and against annexation were
overtly phrased in terms of expediency. In addition, however,
the debate over Texas had an important constitutional dimension, raising fundamental questions about the structure of the
nation. These constitutional issues have never been adequately
addressed by the commentators.
This article will provide a compact but complete analysis of
the constitutional aspects of the struggle over Texas. The article
*

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden) University.
I. The dispute over the annexation of Texas has generated a vast historical literature. Despite its age, JUSTIN H. SMITH, THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS (1911), remains the
most complete, balanced treatment of the issue. Other indispensable sources include 1
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776-1854,
chs. 20-25 (1990); THOMAS R. HIETALA, MANIFEST DESIGN: AI>XIOlJS
AGGRANDIZEMENT IN LATE JACKSONIAN AMERICA chs. 2, 3 (1985); FREDERICK
MERK, SLAVERY AND THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS (1972); MICHAEL A. MORRISON,
SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN WEST: THE ECLIPSE OF MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE
COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 16-36 (1997); DAVID M. PLETCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF
ANNEXATION: TEXAS, OREGON, AND THE MEXICAN WAR (1973); 2 CHARLES G.
SELLERS, JAMES K. POLK: CONTJNENTALIST, 1843-1846 (1966); JOEL M. SILBEY, STORM
OVER TEXAS: THE ANNEXATION CRISIS AND THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR (2005).
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will begin by briefly describing the political background of the
dispute over annexation. It will then discuss the place of the constitutional arguments in the efforts to annex Texas by treaty. The
article will then describe and evaluate the constitutional objections to admitting Texas directly as a state by statute, without the
benefit of a treaty. Finally, the article will assess the significance
of the constitutional debates more generally.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The sequence of events that led to the annexation and admission of Texas can be traced to the Adams-Onis Treaty of
1819, in which the United States renounced its claims to Texas
and the Spanish government agreed to sell Florida to the United
States. Subsequently, the administrations of both John Quincy
Adams and Andrew Jackson made efforts to purchase Texas.
However, the Mexican government rebuffed these overtures.
The situation became more complex after Texas declared its independence from Mexico in 1836. Even before its official recognition of the Republic of Texas by the Jackson administration,
the government of Texas evinced a desire to join the United
States. The reaction to these overtures was divided largely along
sectional lines, with many Southern Democrats pressing hard for
annexation and antislavery Northerners equally vehement in
their opposition.Against this background, for a variety of reasons, neither Jackson nor Martin Van Buren made any effort to
effectuate annexation. 2
The presidential election of 1840 set in motion a series of
events that brought the issue of Texas to center stage in national
politics. The Whig party nominated William Henry Harrison as
the party standard bearer in the election. Seeking to strengthen
Harrison's appeal in the South, convention delegates then selected John Tyler of Virginia to be his running mate. The Whig
ticket was elected, and when Harrison died soon after his inauguration, Tyler succeeded to the presidency in 1841. Dubbed
"His Accidency" by contemporaries, Tyler soon quarreled with
his Whig compatriots and was excommunicated from the party,
effectively becoming a President with no constituency in either
national political party. Tyler pursued annexation with an enthusiasm that stemmed in part from a desire to use the issue to ere-

2. The background for the decision not to pursue the annexation of Texas during
this period is discussed in SMITH, supra note 1, at 63--68.
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ate an independent power base for his administration. His representatives successfully negotiated a treaty which provided that
Texas would be annexed to the United States and, at least initially, would be treated as one of its territories. The treaty of annexation was submitted to the Senate for ratification on April
22, 1844. 3
The submission of the treaty set off an intense political
struggle over ratification. In America, such struggles are often
cast not only as debates over expediency, but also in constitutional terms. The debate over Texas was no exception. The constitutional issues raised by the discussions posed fundamental
questions about the nature of the Union and the circumstances
under which it could be legitimately expanded.
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION
OF THE TREATY
The contours of the debate over the ratification of the treaty
to annex Texas had been largely foreshadowed by the political
controversy that had been generated by the Louisiana Purchase
in 1803. During the debate over Louisiana, some Federalists argued that the addition of such an immense territory would strain
the bonds that held the Union together. For example, Senator
William White of Delaware complained that:
[O]ur citizens will be removed to the immense distance of two
or three thousand miles from the capital of the Union, where
they will scarcely ever feel the rays of the General Government; their affections will become alienated; they will gradually begin to view us as strangers; they will form other commercial connexions [sic], and our interests will become
4
distinct.

New England Federalists were particularly alarmed because
they believed that the eventual admission of states carved from
Louisiana would enhance the political strength of the agrarian
forces of the South and West, to the detriment of the mercantile
interests that predominated in New England. The distress of
New Englanders was exacerbated by the impact that the threefifths clause would have on the potential representation of any

3.

!d. ch VIII.

4.

8 ANNALS OF CO !'I G. 34 (1803).
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slave_ states that might be created in the newly-acquired territory.)
Animated by concerns such as these, Federalists such as
Senator Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts and Senator Uriah
Tracy of Connecticut argued that Jefferson had exceeded his
constitutional authority by entering into the treaty that conveyed
Louisiana to the United States. 6 Lacking explicit textual authority to acquire territory, Jefferson himself had expressed doubts
about the constitutionality of adding such a vast territory by
treaty. Supporters of the treaty, however, adopted the position
that was elaborated by Senator John Taylor of Virginia:
Before a confederation, each State in the Union possessed a
right, as attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by
war, purchase, or treaty. This right must be either still possessed, or forbidden both to each State and to the General
Government, or transferred to the General government. It is
not possessed by the States separately, because war and compacts with foreign Powers and with each other are prohibited
to a separate State; and no other means of acquiring territory
exist. ... Neither the means nor the right of acquiring territory are forbidden to the United States; on the contrary, in
the fourth article of the Constitution, Congress is empowered
"to dispose of and regulate the territory belonging to the
United States." This recognises [sic] the right of the United
States to hold territory. The means of acquiring territory consist of war and compact .... [B]eing both given to the United
States, and prohibited to each State, it follows that these attributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus transferred to the United States, and that, if the means of acquiring
and the right of holding, are equivalent to the right of acquiring territory, then this right merged from the separate States
to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the treatymaking power, and the power of making war; or, indeed, is
literally given to the General Government by the Constitution.7

Pickering and Tracy attacked the constitutionality of the
treaty on narrower grounds. They conceded that the federal
government had the power to acquire Louisiana and to rule it as
a "dependent province." 8 Their objection was based on the
5.
6.
Tracy).
7.
8.

/d. at 56.
/d. at 44-45 (statement of Sen. Pickering); id. at 53-58 (statement of Sen.

/d. at 50.
/d. at 45.

2006)

THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS

385

clause of the treaty that provided that "[t)he inhabitants of [Louisiana] shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States,
and admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of
the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." 9 They
contended that this provision required the federal government to
eventually admit new states from the newly-acquired territory,
and that such a commitment was not within the purview of the
treaty-making power. 10 Indeed, they claimed that the federal
government had no constitutional authority to admit such
states. 11 While Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants Congress
the power to admit new states, Tracy asserted that it "refers to
domestic States only, and not at all to foreign States." 12
Pickering went even further, contending that even an ordinary
constitutional amendment would not suffice and that "the assent
of each individual State [is] necessary for the admission of a foreign country as an associate in the Union: in like manner as in a
commercial house, the consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the company." 13 Supporters of
the treaty did not respond directly to this analysis of the constitutional authority to admit new states; instead, they insisted that
the treaty required only that the inhabitants of Louisiana be recognized as citizens under a territorial government. 14
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments in the
abstract, the outcome of the debate over the ratification of the
Louisiana treaty was foreordained by the political context in
which the debate took place. Despite their general preference
for a narrow interpretation of the powers of the federal government, the dominant Jeffersonians were solidly behind the treaty.
Even among the Federalists, opposition to the treaty came primarily from New Englanders. Thus, when the vote was taken,
the acquisition of Louisiana was overwhelmingly approved by
the Senate. 15
The political cross currents surrounding the proposed annexation of Texas were far more complex. Many Senate Democrats rallied around the treaty. They argued that annexation was

9.
10.
1!.
12.

13.
14.
15.

/d. at 54.
!d. at 58.
/d. at 56.
/d.
/d.at45.
/d. at 49-50.
/d. at 26.
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necessary to protect against the expansion of British influence in
North America; that the entire nation would gain significant
economic benefits from annexation; and that the South in particular needed protection from the abolitionist designs of the
British and would benefit from the acquisition of a vast new territory that would allow the "diffusion" of slaves. 16
Treaty opponents, on the other hand, were drawn from both
the Whig and Democratic parties. They raised a variety of different objections. Some of these objections reflected Whig distrust of the idea of territorial expansion generally. Thus, Whig
Representative Joseph R. Ingersoll asserted that:
The danger of this country was that it would break to pieces
at its extremities-these extremities being made more distant
from the central government; which after all, was like the
heart, from which issued and was circulated the sprin~ of life
throughout the whole system to its farthest extremities. 7

Ingersoll also stated the following:
Considering the annexation of another territory to that which
was already possessed by the nation is calculated to produce
one disastrous result. If there were a defect more prominent
than any other in the national character of these United
States, it was the very want of nationality. A spirit of common
loyalty has not been as successfully cultivated here as among
some other nations. It would be a calamity to weaken still further this vital principle. A nation derives strength as well as
pride from the recollection of its heroic ancestry .... What has
the rock of Plymouth or the settlement- the purity of the pilgrims or the gallantry of the lover of Pocahontas-to do with
Texas or the Rio del Norte? 18

Other objections to the treaty focused more specifically on
Texas itself. Treaty opponents contended that annexation would
almost certainly lead to war with Mexico, and that the movement to acquire Texas was designed to enhance the position of
the "slave power" in the Union. This impression was reinforced
by the Packenham Letter, in which Secretary of State John C.
Calhoun of South Carolina, explicitly defended the treaty on the
ground that annexation was necessary to protect the South from
the abolitionist designs of the British.
16. For perceptive discussions of the political crosscurrents, see MORRISON, supra
note 1, at 20-26; SMITH, supra note 1, ch. XII.
17. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1845).
18. !d. app. at 56.
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In addition to arguing that annexation was inexpedient, the
opponents of the treaty maintained it could not constitutionally
be adopted. Some critics noted that Mexico had never officially
recognized the independence of Texas and argued that the annexation treaty was in effect a declaration of war against Mexico
which required the concurrence of both houses of Congress.
Thus, Whig Senator Spencer Jarnagin of Tennessee asserted
that:
The President and Senate have no right to make war; they
cannot, therefore, rightfully enter into a treaty, the direct effect of which is war, and gives to another nation a right of war
against us, or assumes a war pending. They surely cannot do
that which is an aggression upon another nation, as well as an
usurpation upon our own constitution .... Texas cannot deliver us possession, but only the war upon the event of which
that possession depends; so that the misnamed treaty of annexation or incorporation is not such, but war under another
19
name, faithlessly and unconstitutionally made.

More commonly, treaty opponents made objections similar
to those that had been leveled against Jefferson's purchase of the
Louisiana Territory. Opponents of annexation revived the arguments of the Federalists who had opposed Jefferson. Thus,
Jarnagin contended the following:
The constitution has given, and could give, no such authority
as that now assumed by the treaty-making power. It is a
strictly extra and ultra-constitutional one; for a constitution is
an agreement between the parties to it. If it is that of a single
society, then the parties are the body of its citizens. If it is a
compact between several societies, forming by it a federative
league, it is these separately who make the parties to it. In either case, to introduce or exclude a member cannot be within
the scope of the compact; because it would vary the parties,
and so terminate the agreement. The terms of the instrument
itself could in no manner bestow a power contrary to this
condition, inherent in the contract itself, and incapable of being excluded from it. Legally to alter these, the special assent
of each party must precede the act. 20

Other opponents of annexation distinguished between the
acquisition of an incorporated territory such as Louisiana and
acquisition of a hitherto sovereign state such as Texas. John
19.

20.

CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Scss. app. at 685 (1844).
!d. app. at 682.
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Quincy Adams made this point bluntly in a resolution that he
proposed in 1843:
Resolved, That by the constitution of the United States no
power is delegated to their congress, or to any department or
departments of their government, to affix to this union any
foreign state, or the people thereof. Resolved, That any attempt of the government of the United States, by an act of
congress or by treaty, to annex to this union the republic of
Texas, or the people thereof, would be a violation of the constitution of the United States, null and void, and to which the
free states of this union and their people ought not to submit.2I

Ultimately, the treaty of annexation was overwhelmingly rejected by the Senate. Attitudes toward the treaty broke down
along predictable political lines. Whigs, who opposed territorial
expansion generally, voted against ratification by a twenty-seven
to one margin. Southern Democrats, by contrast, were almost
equally unanimous in supporting the treaty, voting ten to one in
support of ratification. By contrast, Northern Democrats faced a
complex political dilemma. On one hand, Democrats generally
supported territorial expansion, and by the time that the ratification vote was taken, the party had adopted a platform that advocated the annexation of both Texas and Oregon. However, Democrats who supported the treaty risked being labeled tools of
the Southern slaveocracy. In addition, some Northern Democrats were angered by the role that annexationists had played in
denying the party's presidential nomination to Martin Van Buren. Against this background, it should not be surprising that
Northern Democrats split, with seven out of twelve voting to ratify.22
IV. THE ADMISSION OF TEXAS AS A STATE
This defeat of the treaty did not end the controversy over
Texas. Even before Senate action on the treaty, Tyler had entertained the idea of having Texas admitted as a state by a joint
resolution of Congress. 23 This proposal gained momentum after
the election of 1844. Henry Clay, the nominee of the Whig party,
opposed immediate annexation. Martin Van Buren, the pre21.
22.
UNITED
23.

MERK, supra note 1, at 136.
6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE
STATES OF AMERICA 312 (1844).
SMITH, supra note 1, at 281.
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convention favorite for the Democratic nomination, had taken a
similar position. However, the Democratic nomination ultimately went to James K. Polk, an ardent annexationist who
made the issue a centerpiece of his campaign. When Polk won a
narrow victory over Clay, annexationists claimed a popular
mandate for their position. Although the strength of the Whigs
in the Senate was substantially reduced in the Senate, even in the
new Congress Democrats would be well-short of the two-thirds
majority necessary to ratify a treaty. Thus, the idea of proceeding by joint resolution was the only viable option.
Not surprisingly, opponents of annexation raised strong
constitutional objections to this effort. Those scholars who have
ventured an opinion have typically been equally dubious about
the constitutionality of admitting Texas as a state by joint resolution, rather than acquiring its territory by treaty, which would
have required a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Thus, for example, during his more general discussion of the joint resolution,
Frederick Merk states flatly that this procedure "required twisting, indeed wrenching, the language of the Constitution. " 24 Similarly, William W. Freehling suggests that "southern annexationists appeared to be playing fast and loose with majoritarian rules
[and their] disregard for any republican procedure in their way
caused Yankees and even key Southerners to bridle at their bullying."25 In fact, the claim that Texas could constitutionally be
admitted by joint resolution was much more plausible than these
comments would suggest.
One objection was that Texas could not be immediately annexed as a state because no Texan could meet the residency requirement for service in the Senate or House of Representatives.
The Constitution requires members of the Senate to have been
citizens of the United States for nine years, and members of the
House of Representatives to have been citizens for seven years.
Opponents contended that, since Texas was a foreign country
and had previously been a part of Mexico, residents would not
become citizens of the United States until annexation was complete. Under this view, all Texans would be ineligible to serve in
the Senate for nine years after annexation and ineligible to serve
in the House for seven years. In short, under this view, immediate statehood for Texas would create the anomaly of a state that
could not be represented in Congress.
24.
25.

MERK, supra note 1, at 139.
FREEHLING, supra note 1, at 441.
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By contrast, supporters of annexation argued that Congress
could simply take the view that Texas had in fact become a possession of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase, that it
had not been legitimately surrendered by the Adams-Onis
Treaty, and thus that the residents of Texas had been citizens of
the United States since the early nineteenth century. 26 Others,
such as Whig Representative Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia,
contended that the term "citizen of the United States" should be
interpreted to include citizenship of a state that was currently
part of the United States, and that once Texas was annexed, the
full amount of time that a person had been a citizen of Texas
should count toward the constitutional requirements. 27
In any event, the major constitutional claim of antiannexationists was that the use of a joint resolution usurped the
treaty-making authority held jointly by the President and the
Senate. On this point, both sides appealed to the original understanding of the Constitution. Representative Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts provided one of the clearest explanations
of the anti-annexation argument:
[T]he constitution provide[ s] a legislative and an executive
power, providing a treaty-making power of the executive and
the Senate of the United States; and while such a power existed, the resolutions now [being considered by the House of
Representatives] had no sort of right to be there. This House
had no authority to make treaty compacts with foreign powers .... It was the doctrine of the constitution that one third of
the States- and those might be even the smallest, might forbid alliances with foreign powers .... [Winthrop] knew the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs had omitted
the word treaty [from the resolution], and had taken care to
use the word "settlement," and "Texas consenting;" but it related to laws, and lands, and persons, out of our territory, and
therefore it belonged to the treaty-making power. 28

Arguments such as these reflected a basic misunderstanding
about the scope of the treaty-making power. In essence, Winthrop was suggesting that the joint resolution was constitutionally flawed because it was designed to achieve a result that was
properly within the treaty-making authority, while at the same
time circumventing the requirement of ratification by two-thirds
of the Senate. The difficulty with this argument is that any effort
26.
27.

28.

COI'G. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1845).
ld. at 190.
!d. at 95.
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to directly admit Texas as a state of United States by treaty
alone would itself have been clearly unconstitutional. While the
House of Representatives has no role in considering treaties, the
Constitution clearly requires that the House approve the admission of new states. Thus, the joint resolution was not subject to
the objection that it trenched on the treaty-making power.
The stronger constitutional claim was based on an appeal to
the basic concept of enumerated powers. The argument was that
the power to admit new states was the only conceivable source
of authority for the joint resolution, and that this power did not
extend to the admission of foreign sovereigns. Senator Rufus
Choate of Massachusetts put the point bluntly:
[U]ntil it was found [that] the treaty of last session had no
chance of passing the Senate, no human being, save one-no
man, woman, or child, in this Union, or out of this Union,
wise or foolish, drunk or sober, was ever heard to breathe one
syllable about this power in the constitution of admitting new
States being applicable to the admission of foreign nations,
29
governments, or states.

Under this view, Texas could only be admitted as a state after
having first been acquired by the United States through the medium of a treaty.
Not surprisingly, defenders of the joint resolution procedure
had a different perspective on the constitutional issues. Some
annexationists contended that, notwithstanding the provisions of
the Adams-Onis Treaty, Texas was rightfully a possession of the
United States whose title had never been validly conveyed to
Spain. This argument was based on two premises. The first
premise was that Texas was part of the territory that had been
ceded to the United States in the Louisiana Purchase. The second premise was that cession of Texas in the Adams-Onis Treaty
was void because the federal government lacked authority to
transfer any portion of the territory of the United States to a
foreign government. Under this view, the admission of Texas as
a state was in principle no different than the admission of the
other states that had been carved out of the Louisiana Purchase.30
Opponents of admission pointed out that, if the AdamsOnis Treaty was not valid, then Florida should be reconveyed to

29.
30.

/d. at 304.
See, e.g., id. at 158.
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Spain. At the very least, as Representative James Belser of Ala~al?a observed, it wou_ld be "ver~ bad grace ... to deny the validity of the treaty [m 1845]." Representative Stephen A.
Douglass of Illinois had an ingenious response to this argument.
Douglass conceded that the United States was estopped from
denying the validity of the treaty per se. At the same time, he
noted that the treaty which effectuated the Louisiana Purchase
provided that "the ceded territory should be admitted into our
Union, as soon as possible." 32 Having gained their independence
from Mexico, the people of Texas were now entitled to claim the
benefits of this provision and demand admission into the Union.33
However, even Douglass's solution did not meet a more
fundamental objection to reliance on the Louisiana Purchase
Treaty. Opponents of the joint resolution procedure argued simply that the United States' claim to Texas under this treaty was
dubious at best, and that on this point the Adams-Onis Treaty
did no more than confirm the status quo. Given the uncertainty
surrounding both the original relationship of Texas to the Louisiana Purchase and the claim that the government did not have
authority to abandon that claim, supporters of the joint resolution turned to other arguments to bolster their legal claims.
Annexationists at times contended that the precedents of
North Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont established the authority of Congress to proceed by joint resolution. All of these
states had been independent entities prior to being admitted to
the Union created by the Constitution, and each was admitted
without benefit of a treaty. The supporters of the joint resolution
contended that the case of Texas was no different. Antiannexationists, however, argued that the issues presented by
these cases were quite different from those presented by the controversy over Texas.
North Carolina and Rhode Island were the easiest precedents for the opponents of the joint resolution to distinguish.
Admittedly, both states were technically independent at the time
that they entered the Union. Neither had ratified the Constitution on June 21, 1788-the date on which, by its terms, the Constitution went into effect by virtue of ratification by New Hampshire, the ninth state to give its assent. Indeed, both states

31.
32.
33.

ld. at 88.
!d. at 96.
ld.
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initially rejected the Constitution-Rhode Island by popular referendum on March 2434 and North Carolina by a vote in the
state ratification convention on August 2. 35 Thus, both states
were at least technically independent until state conventions ultimately ratified the new Constitution on May 29, 1790,36 and
November 21, 1789, respectively. 37
Nonetheless, the situation of North Carolina and Rhode Island was dramatically different from that of Texas. Both North
Carolina and Rhode Island had been signatories to the Articles
of Confederation, and (although Rhode Island sent no delegates
to the Constitutional Convention) both were among the states
originally invited to join the new government created by the
Constitution. 38 Thus, the federal goverrunent had no occasion to
choose between the treaty power and the power to admit new
states. Instead, no Congressional action was necessary for these
states to enter the Union.
The admission of Vermont raised more complex issues. 39
Vermont was in fact an independent republic at the time that it
was admitted to the Union by an act of Congress on March 4,
1791. Although Vermonters fought against the British during the
Revolutionary War, the goverrunent of Vermont had not been a
party to the Articles of Confederation, had not been represented
at the Constitutional Convention, and had not been invited by
Congress to ratify the Constitution in 1787. Indeed, at one time
Vermont explored the possibility of negotiating a separate peace
with the British and even reentering the British Empire.
At the same time, Vermont had always been considered to
be within the territorial limits of the United States and was recognized as such by the Treaty of Paris, which brought a formal
end to the Revolutionary War in 1783. The goverrunent of the
republic was created in 1775 by a group of settlers who, beginning in 1760, had occupied land that had initially been granted to
the colony of New York. For almost the entire period between
the formation of the Republic of Vermont and the admission of
34. 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 1066
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
35. !d. at 1068-69.
36. !d. at 1074.
3 7. !d. at 1072.
38. !d. at 935-36,939.
39. The circumstances surrounding the admission of Vermont are described in detail in the essays in A MORE PERFECT UNION: VERMONT BECOMES A STATE, 1777-1816
(Michael Sherman ed., 1991).
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Vermont to the Union, New York claimed that the breakaway
republic in fact remained part of New York. This claim, together
with territorial disputes between Vermont and both New Hampshire and Massachusetts, was primarily responsible for the failure of Vermont to become a state under the Articles of Confederation. The admission of Vermont as a state under the
Constitution came almost immediately after Vermont had paid
New York thirty thousand dollars to abandon its claim in 1791.
Moreover, the situation of Vermont had been a focal point
of the Convention during the drafting of Article IV, Section 3.
As originally proposed by Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania,
this section would have provided that "no new State shall be
erected within the limits of any of the present States, without the
consent of the Legislature of such State." 40 Luther Martin objected that this language would have allowed Vermont "[to] be
reduced by force in favor of the States claiming it[.]" 41 While
Martin's proposal to deal with the problem was rejected by the
Convention, other delegates had similar concerns. "[T]o save
Vermont ... from a dependence on the consent of N[ew] York,"
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut moved to amend the
Morris proposal so that it would read "no new State shall be
hereafter formed or erected within the limits of any of the present States without the consent of the Legislature of such
State." 42 He reasoned that Vermont was already a state, and thus
his amendment would obviate the need to obtain the consent of
New York as a precondition for admission to the Union. While
the Johnson amendment was initially approved by the Convention, it did not survive in the Committee on Style.
Ultimately, Morris himself devised the solution to the problem of Vermont. He proposed to amend his original language so
that consent would be required only if the new state was within
the jurisdiction of another state rather than simply within its limits. Morris asserted that, while New York might plausibly claim
that all or part of Vermont was within its territorial limits, the
government of New York could not claim jurisdiction over Vermont because Vermont had become a sovereign state. This
43
amendment was accepted by a majority of the states and ultimately incorporated into the final draft of the Constitution.
40.
ed, rev.
41.
42.
43.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVE:"'TION OF 1787, at 455 (Max Farrand
ed. 1937) [hereina(tcr RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].

!d.
See id. at 463 (emphasis added to indicate Johnson's addition).
!d.
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Against this background, the analogy between the admission of Vermont and the admission of Texas is imperfect at best.
To be sure, the discussions at the Convention reflected the drafters' belief that Vermont was a sovereign state that was separate
and independent from the Union that had been created by the
Articles of Confederation and would be reconfigured by the new
Constitution. However, at the same time, they saw Vermont as
part of the same basic territorial unit that comprised the United
States. Indeed, William Johnson contended that Vermont
should, if necessary, be compelled to enter the Union. 44 Unless
one accepts the view that Texas was part of the Louisiana Purchase and had never been validly ceded to Spain, the situation of
Texas was obviously quite different.
Ultimately, both sides of the controversy appealed directly
to the language and evolution of Article IV, section 3, Clause 1
of the Constitution, which states that:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
but no new State shall be formed or erected with the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more states, or Parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as
45
of the Congress.

This formulation differs significantly from the analogous
provision in the Articles of Confederation, which provided that:
Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the
measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony
shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be
46
.
agree d to b y nme states.

As Madison noted in The Federalist Papers, the language in
the Articles seemed to encompass only the admission of former
colonies of Great Britain. 47 Nonetheless, even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, Congress had adopted the Northwest
Ordinance, which looked to the creation of new states in the
area west of the Alleghenies that had previously been claimed by
a number of different colonies. In order to deal with this problem, the Virginia Plan proposed that "provision ought to be
44.
45.
46.
47.
1961).

/d. at 456.
U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 1.
ARTS. OF CON FEDERATION art. XI.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274-75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

396

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:381

made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits
of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government and Territory, or otherwise." 48 On June 19, the Convention agreed to this concept in principle, 49 and on August 6, the
Committee on Detail reported the following clause:
New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits
of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into
this Government; but to such admission the consent of two
thirds of the members present in each house shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the
present States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States
50
shall be also necessary to its admission.

On August 29, the Convention adopted a substitute proposed by
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania: "New States may be admitted by the Legislature into the Union: but no new State shall be
erected within the limits of any of the present States, without the
consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as of the
Gen[ eral] Legislature." 51 With only minor alterations, the Morris language was ultimately incorporated into the Constitution as
Article IV, Section 3. 52
Supporters of annexation relied on both the text and the
legislative history of Article IV to support their position. For example, Representative Thomas H. Bayly of Virginia asserted the
following:
The power [to admit new states] is general, without any other
limitation than that "no new State shall be formed or created
within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be
formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of
States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of Congress." The imposition of this limitation, upon the most familiar rules of construction, excludes
the idea of the intention to impose any other. 53

Annexationists bolstered this argument by noting that the
original proposal from the Committee on Detail had expressly
limited the power of Congress to the admission of states established within the limits of the United States, while the Morris lan48.
49.
50.
51.
added).
52.
53.

1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 22.

!d. at 322.
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 188.
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 455 (emphasis

!d. at 464; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Cor-;G. GLOBE, 28thCong., 2d Sess. 102 (1845).
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guage contained no such limitation. The final language of the
Constitution is much the same, stating that "New States may be
admitted by the Congress into this Union" without requiring
that the states be formed from territory that is already owned by
the United States government or one of the state governments.
They reasoned that, because the Convention had considered and
rejected language that would have limited the Article IV power
to areas within the territorial limits of the United States, the
drafters must have believed that the power to admit new states
was broad enough to encompass situations such as the admission
of Texas. 54
While this change in language does provide some support
for the pro-annexation position, other aspects of the debates
over Article IV suggest the opposite conclusion. The problem
for the pro-annexation argument is that the Convention also
considered and rejected language that would have explicitly
armed Congress with the authority to admit states that were not
within the preexisting territorial limits of the United States. On
August 30, Luther Martin of Maryland moved to replace the
Morris language with a clause which provided in part that "[t]he
Legislature of the [United States] shall have power to erect New
States within as well as without the territory claimed by the several States or either of them, and admit the same into the Union. "55 Only the delegations of Maryland, New Jersey, and
Delaware supported this proposal, 56 and Article IV as ultimately
adopted tracked the Morris formulation.
Ultimately, it would be a mistake to read too much into either the adoption of the Morris formulation or the rejection of
the Martin language. The goal of the Martin proposal was not to
clarify the territorial reach of the power to admit new states.
Rather, it was designed to give Congress the power to divide
states without the consent of the relevant state legislatures. 5 7 Indeed, Martin's general focus was apparently shared by most of
the delegates to the Convention. With the somewhat ambiguous
exception of the Vermont situation, the drafters were not thinking of the problem of territorial expansion. Instead, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were preoccupied with
the problem of creating a framework of government that would
54. /d. at 101.
55. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 464 (emphasis
added).
56. /d.
57. /d. at 463-M.
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adequately deal with the problems that were then facing the recently-freed colonies (including their Western possessions).
Nonetheless, the historical record includes some fragmentary evidence that bears directly on the annexation issue. Some
annexationists also appealed to the authority of James Madison,
widely-regarded as the father of the Constitution. For example,
Representative Joseph A. Woodward of South Carolina noted
that, in The Federalist Papers, Madison had declared that "the
immediate object of the constitution was to secure the the [sic]
Union of the thirteen primitive States, and such States as might
arise within their bosom or within their neighborhoods. " 58
Woodward and others reasoned that Madison's assertion reflected a contemporary understanding that the Union might
eventually include states formed from territory outside the
boundaries of the original thirteen colonies, and that the power
to admit new states must have been drafted with that possibility
in mind. 59
By contrast, private correspondence between Morris and
Henry W. Livingston in 1803 points to the opposite conclusion.
Expressing the view that Louisiana and other foreign territory
should only be acquired as "provinces [with] no voice in our
councils," Morris asserted that "[i]n wording the third section of
the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to
establish [this principle]. Candor obliges me to add my belief,
that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition
would have been made. " 60
For a person who is seeking in good faith to follow the
original understanding of the Constitution, the Morris letter presents something of a dilemma. On one hand, the letter is a clear
expression of the understanding of the man who actually drafted
the relevant provision-an expression which, since made in private, is entirely credible. On the other, the drafter seems to suggest that he made a deliberate effort to obscure the meaning of
the provision from the other delegates because he realized that,
if they understood the language as he did, they would oppose the
provision. Further, Madison's statement in The Federalist suggests that the other delegates did not share Morris's understanding of Article IV.

58.
59.
60.
note 40,

CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1845) (emphasis in original).
/d.
The letter is reproduced in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
at 404.
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In any event, against this background of conflicting evidence, the results of the presidential election changed the political dynamic sufficiently to pave the way for the approval of the
joint resolution. With the party having succeeded in electing a
President on a platform that promised annexation, dissident
Northern Democrats came under pressure to change their position. This factor alone was sufficient to guarantee a victory in the
House of Representatives, which was under Democratic control.
There, the resolution passed notwithstanding the fact that
twenty-seven anti-slavery Democrats joined the united Whigs in
opposition. 61
Supporters of annexation faced a more difficult task in the
Senate. The Whigs held a slender majority in the lame duck session of the Twenty-Eighth Congress that met in early 1845. Thus,
even assuming that Democratic senators could unite around a
joint resolution, some Whig support would be necessary for passage. While Northern Whigs continued their resolute opposition
to annexation, the election had left their Southern counterparts
with an uncomfortable political dilemma. Polk's strength in the
Deep South had demonstrated the appeal of annexation to the
general populace in the slave states. Moreover, the results of the
election had guaranteed that Democrats would have a solid majority in the Senate in the incoming Twenty-Ninth Congress, virtually assuring the eventual success of the annexation movement. Nonetheless, most Whigs continued to stand firmly against
the joint resolution. However, three Southern Whigs senators
deserted their party, providing the pro-annexation forces with a
razor-thin victory by a margin of twenty-seven to twenty-five. 62
The government of Texas accepted the terms presented to it,
and Texas officially joined the Union as a state on December 29,
1845.
V. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the practical impact of constitutional arguments on the debate over the annexation of Texas appears to
have been negligible. The depth and sophistication of the constitutional analysis was often extremely impressive. Nonetheless,
the evidence does not suggest that the arguments actually
61. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 372 (1845).
62. !d. at 362. For a general discussion of the political dilemma faced by Southern
Whigs, see MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE Ar-iD FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:
JACKSONIAN POLITICS Ai'<D THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 218-21 (2003).
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changed any votes. The members of the House of Representatives and the Senate do not seem to have developed their positions on the constitutional issues based on "neutral," distinctively legal principles; instead, they chose the constitutional
positions that would support their predetermined political views.
The debate over the annexation of Texas is by no means
unique in this regard. For example, John C. Calhoun could
hardly have believed that Northern senators and representatives
who were committed to the position that slavery should be excluded from the Mexican cession would be converted to the
Southern view by his argument that such exclusion would be unconstitutional.63 Conversely, there is no indication that congressional support for the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was in any way
weakened by those who argued that the provisions of the statute
violated the constitutional rights of putative escapees. 64 Nonetheless, appeals to the Constitution played an important role in
creating the political climate surrounding the debate over these
Issues.
Throughout our history, most Americans have viewed the
Constitution as far more than a simple collection of legal rules.
Instead, the document is also seen as the repository of the most
fundamental values underlying the structure of the American
government and society more generally. Thus, when opponents
label a policy "unconstitutional," they are in effect expressing
the view that the policy is not only wrongheaded, but is inimical
to those values. This claim has the effect of both exhorting opponents to use their strongest efforts to defeat the policy, and of
signaling the supporters of the policy that the opposition views
implementation of the policy as an ongoing threat to the stability
of the system as a whole, and that the opposition is therefore
unlikely to be defused by the ordinary process of political accommodation and compromise. Plainly, those who invoked the
Constitution in opposition to the annexation of Texas saw the
issue in just such terms. Whigs in general emphasized the destabilizing effect of annexation generally, and Northern opponents
asserted that the addition of such a vast territory in which slavery was tolerated would upset the delicate political balance between North and South upon which amicable relations between
the sections depended-particularly since the joint resolution
63.
64.
Fugitive
299-3ll4

For Calhoun's argument, see CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 455 (1846).
For an excellent example of the argument against the constitutionality of the
Slave Act of 1850, see HORACE MANN, SLAVERY: LEITERS AND SPEECHES
(B. B. Musey & Co. 1853).
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provided that Texas could be divided into as many as five states.
Subsequent events demonstrated that these concerns were far
from insubstantial; while annexation did not result in the immediate disruption of the Union, it set in motion a series of events
that ultimately led to the Civil War. 65 Thus, while the constitutional arguments against annexation may not have been compelling in purely legal terms, the fears that underlay those arguments were ultimately vindicated.

65. The best account of these events is DAVID M. POTIER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS,
1848-1861 (1976).

